testing

How much do you save in Income tax with the new slabs? Enter your taxable income (net of all deductions like 80C, medical insurance etc.) and hit the big button to see how much more you save per month, starting April 1, 2010.

Disclaimer: This is NOT tax advice. This is educational material only.

Enter your income:
(Net of all deductions, 80C etc.)
Rs.
Women Senior Citizen

For Amount: Rs.
Taxes Paid in 2009-10 Taxes Paid in 2010-11
Description Tax Description Tax
Slab 1: Slab 1:
Slab 2: Slab 2:
Slab 3: Slab 3:
Surcharge: Surcharge:
Cess: Cess:
Total: Total:
Saving:
Raise Per Month:
Copyright (c) Deepak Shenoy, 2010
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Monthly Income Plans Versus Fixed Deposit

Mutual funds have monthly income plans – MIPs – that provide a monthly dividend; how do these compare against FDs?

First, note that MIPs are not risk free – they invest a little in equities as a “kicker”. So if you’re looking for ultra risk-free return, this is not it. I’m just looking at it as something that a retiree or semi-retiree can invest in, and doesn’t mind the slight additional equity risk. A lot of people I know would qualify.

Let’s take a 25 lakh investment made in an MIP – HDFC’s Long Term MIP Monthly Dividend plan is what I chose. Compare it with the same amount invested in a Fixed Deposit (FD) yielding 9% (Okay, no one gives 9% a year on FD monthly income, but let me be aggressive).

Dividends on MIPs are tax-free; FD Interest is taxable. I’ve assumed a 20% tax.

Nowadays banks deduct 10-20% tax at source for FD interest – so if you get a lower tax rate you have to ask for a refund. That is crazy for someone who’s investing for a monthly income!

But what about the returns? I plotted the three year graph (assumed started on Jan 1,2007) of the entire return. The line graphs are the return-to-date for MIP and FD (including interest/dividend post tax) and the bars are the monthly income levels.

image

The FD interest is constant, as expected (a net yield of 7.2%). The Monthly Income Plan has wayward income but you see the equity kicker give spiky income, but they seem to cap themselves at the lower end to what FDs would give.

MIPs seem to generate slightly higher income in parts – sorta like getting a bonus every once in a while.

The current MIP market value is 26.94 lakhs, and the total dividend in three years adds up to Rs. 6.64 lakhs. The FD on the other hand, has a 25 lakh principal with 5.1 lakhs distributed over three years.

Liquidity wise: both the FD and MIP are liquid (you can get money out in a few days). The FD carries a penalty for early though, and the HDFC MIP has a 1% exit load for the first year.

On the face of it, with the higher risk, the MIP seems like a useful option for someone with a large corpus and wants a higher monthly income. And lesser tax reporting hassles or refund issues.

Note: Other options – tax free bonds that yield around 6.5% to 7.5%, Government 10 year bonds that yield a taxable 7.5% or corporate 10 year debentures that yield 10% or so. Some of these have monthly options too; and may be even better (I need to investigate more, please comment if you can point me someplace).

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RBI Mandates Single Base Rate for Banks

RBI has decided to curb the current practice of banks using different benchmark rates for different customers. From April 1, 2010 all banks will have to use a single base rate that will be the reference rate for all customers:

  • The Base Rate system will replace the BPLR system with effect from April 1, 2010. Banks may determine their actual lending rates on loans and advances with reference to the Base Rate. Base Rate shall include all those elements of the lending rates that are common across all categories of borrowers. While each bank may decide its own Base Rate, some of the criteria that could go into the determination of the Base Rate are: (i) cost of deposits; (ii) adjustment for the negative carry in respect of CRR and SLR; (iii) unallocatable overhead cost for banks such as aggregate employee compensation relating to administrative functions in corporate office, directors’ and auditors’ fees, legal and premises expenses, depreciation, cost of printing and stationery, expenses incurred on communication and advertising, IT spending, and cost incurred towards deposit insurance;and (iv) profit  margin. An illustration for computing the Base Rate is set out in the Annex.

  • The actual lending rates charged to borrowers would be the Base Rate plus borrower-specific charges, which will include product-specific operating costs, credit risk premium and tenor premium.

  • All categories of loans should henceforth be priced only with reference to the Base Rate. The Base Rate could also serve as the reference benchmark rate for floating rate loan products, apart from the other external market benchmark rates. The floating interest rate based on external benchmarks should, however, be equal to or above the Base Rate at the time of sanction or renewal.

  • Since the Base Rate will be the minimum rate for all commercial loans, banks are not permitted to resort to any lending below the Base Rate.

  • The Base Rate system would be applicable for all new loans and for those old loans that come up for renewal. However, if the existing borrowers want to switch to the new system before the expiry of the existing contracts, in such cases the new/revised rate structure should be mutually agreed upon by the bank and the borrower.

  • This is significant – many banks have had this kind of funda:

    • Lure a customer using a fundoofied low interest rate like 7.25% floating
    • Make the paperwork such that the loan adjusts with respect to a benchmark rate called “Home Loan Benchmark”, say 200 basis points below it. Set this benchmark rate at 9.25%.
    • When the customer’s signed up and paid for a few months, INCREASE this Home Loan Benchmark rate slowly – to 10%, then 11% etc.. The customer now has to pay 200bps lower.
    • Most customers won’t care because you will increase the tenure of the loan rather than the EMI. They are too busy or ignorant to realize that they are paying 10% more interest to the bank over the term of the loan if the loan tenure is extended, for each 0.25% increase!
    • Example: 30 lakh loan for 20 years at 7.25% is 23,711 a month, and you pay Rs. 27 lakhs in interest over 20 years. If they bump up the rate to 7.5%, and keep the EMI the same, you’ll pay it for 20 years 11 months; the amount of interest you pay, though, goes up to 29.4 lakhs, or 9.36% more. Screw that – you pay 3% interest in the first year.
    • But this means you can’t snare the new suckers – who want low interest loans. So instead of losing that juicy extra income from the already trapped customer, you create a different benchmark called “NEW Home Loan Benchmark” and offer loans at 7.25% only to new customers. That way you can milk the older customers who have no choice but to pay, and get new customers at lower rates.
    • Your older customers can’t run off easily; you set up a pre-payment penalty.

    This is at the retail end. At the corporate end banks were killing each other by offering rates way below the BPLR benchmarks (one of the many numbers) and since there is no “bottom” banks could simply lowball each other to whatever end.

    A fixed base rate will solve some of these problems – all loans, corporate or retail, must benchmark themselves to the base rate. (Note: Floating rate products can take on external benchmarks also – but that’s good enough if the bank doesn’t control the external benchmark. )

    What this will do though, is show you the huge spread between what is offered to corporates and what you and I get. Where corporates can get loans at 7%, we can only get them at 10% or more; once they put in the base rate at 7% we get some negotiating room to eke out a better rate. But honestly most borrowers will be too ignorant to even check a bank website for it’s current base rate, so who am I kidding. All it will do right now is create a more competitive environment for certain banks.

    Public sector banks are most certainly going to benefit – they didn’t indulge in these kinds of practices. Private banks are going to see margin erosion. I hope they make pre-payment penalties illegal too – then private banks are hosed. But there are ways to make money – not as much as before but still, good money – for banks, and I hope they come around and offer better products instead of trying to squeeze the last naya paisa from customers.

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    WTF: 34 million “Poorer” Indians due to the Recession

    A tweet from @inquestioner went “Scary,34 million joined the ranks of the poor in India because of the recession that everyone was in denial of.UNDESA figurs.” [sic]

    I usually find these figures very global-warming type – meaning, highly suspect and jugaad methodology - so I thought I’d investigate. In the “World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2010” report, Page 35, they say:

    The reduction in employment and income opportunities [due to the slowdown] has led to a considerable slowdown in the progress towards poverty reduction and the fight against hunger. Estimates by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UN/
    DESA) suggest that, in 2009, between 47 and 84 million more people have remained poor or will have fallen into poverty in developing countries and economies in transition than would have been the case had pre-crisis growth continued its course (table I.3). This setback was felt predominantly in East and South Asia, where between 29 and 63
    million people were likely affected, of whom about two thirds were in India.

    So the figures for Asia are between 29 and 63 million people – that is a huge enough range for me to say “WTF” anyhow, but let’s not digress – and 2/3rd are in India, so for us it’s between 20 and 42 million people. 34m is somewhat in the middle if you are slightly mathematically challenged, but let’s not bicker about a few million here and there.

    The important thing is how they arrived at it. They said – okay, India’s growing at 9%. If it continued to grow at 9%,  then X number of people would be poor. But because of this slowdown, we have Y poor people, and Y is larger than X. Therefore, this figure Y-X is the number of people that have been reduced to poverty by the slowdown.

    Let’s not talk X and Ys. Let’s talk real numbers.

    Assume we had a 100 poor people. Let’s say that for every 1% growth, we reduced poverty by 1 person. So with 9% growth, we are left with 91 poor.

    But we grew only 6%. So, post the recession,  we have 94 poor people. 94 is less than 100. That might sound like a good thing. But no.

    The UN-DESA way of looking at this – and their glasses must forever be half empty – is: Goddamn recession did not take 3 people out of poverty, so 3 people got poorer.

    Another way of looking at it is: 6 people got out of poverty. 6 is good. Even 1 is good, come to think of it, but 6 is definitely good. And it is wrong to focus on the 3 number. 

    For one, 9% growth was not sustainable; it was extraordinary. It was likely to be 6-7% averaged over years, so one year we’d do more, another we’d do less. Extrapolating a pre-crisis growth figure is silly; in that way, I could extrapolate the “Hindu Rate of Growth” of 3% pre-1992 and say damn, 600 million people are out of poverty today since 1992 because we grew more than expected.

    Second, the focus on the smaller figure throws real achievement out the window. There are no real figures in that sheet – but I can imagine that if this calculation yields 34 million “poorer”, then the absolute number of people we got out of poverty must then exceed 60 million. That means, we got 6 crore people out of poverty, post recession – less than the 9 crore we expected. That statement paints an entirely different picture.

    Finally, I must say the statistics are screwed up because it uses per-capita income to determine poverty levels – yet, if money was earlier more concentrated in a few rich people, and post recession got better distributed among the entire population, the poverty figures UN-DESA quotes will be overstated. They acknowledge this, though:

    It should be noted that the estimates presented here take into consideration the impact of the downturn only on growth in income per capita compared with continued pre-crisis trends. Hence, these should be interpreted in the first instance as a slowdown in poverty reduction owing to a drop in the mean per capita income of developing countries. For lack of additional information, the estimates do not take into account likely changes in income distribution.

    That statistic is simply gleaned from macro-figures. We aren’t told how many people are really poor (buying power wise), how many of these are urban/rural, how many are in organized/unorganized sectors, what’s the birth/death impact and how the numbers are moving. Those stats may tell us where we need to focus, where achievements are good and where we can improve. What we can’t afford is to have global statements like “the recession made 34 million people poorer” – because it is a hollow statement with conveniently extrapolated matter, and yields nothing. It truly makes us poorer.

    Girish Shahane has a good post about this too.

    So once in a while, I will rant. This is that time. Thanks for listening.

    P.S. Why is this relevant to trading? One comes across this kind of fallacy all the time – the subprime crisis was exacerbated by people running excel sheets extrapolating data and lost connection with logic (once it boils down to “House prices always go up” the logic failure is evident).  LTCM failed because they assumed “Normal distributions” but it didn’t live up to its name. And the efficient market theory fell flat on its face because despite all sorts of mathematical proof, it simply was non-existent. (My feeling is that it’s attractive to a lot of people for it’s simplicity, so they like indexing/asset-allocation/passive investing even if the the data may not apply to India)

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    Linkfest on Greece

    Greece is on the verge of default or a bailout or a bit of both, it seems. The idea of any of these events happening has spooked world markets; now any rumour seems to come with big market moves – an indicator of a panic move in the offing. Who knows, maybe we’re in the middle of the panic move – remember, markets the world over have corrected 10% – and the next round is near.

    • At Naked Capitalism: A description of the rumour that started markets rolling upwards, that Germany would back a Greek Rescue. First, the telegraph kicked in an article saying the German Finance Minister was going to rescue them, and German banks have exposures of €43bn in Greece.

    Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, has asked officials to prepare a plan in time for a summit of EU leaders on Thursday, according to reports in the German media. The options include either a loan from EU states or some sort of institutional EU response.

    Germany’s apparent backing for a bail-out comes despite worries that it will lead to the breakdown of fiscal discipline across the Club Med region. It also raises troubling questions of fairness. Ireland has tackled its own crisis by slashing wages and going far beyond any measure so far offered by Greece, yet Dublin has not received help.

    Germany’s dramatic shift in policy changes the character of the euro project. It follows weeks of soul-searching in Berlin, and after increasingly loud pleas from Brussels, Paris and southern capitals. The deciding factor was concern that letting Greece fail risked a “Lehman-style” run on Club Med debt, with systemic spill-over across Europe.

    German exposure to the region amounts to €43bn in Greece, €47bn in Portugal, €193bn in Ireland, and €240bn in Spain, according to the Bank for International Settlements. German lenders are already vulnerable, with the world’s lowest risk-adjusted capital ratios bar Japan…

    “Government spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm rejects as unfounded reports citing coalition sources saying a decision for aid for Greece has in effect been made,” a government official quoted him as saying. Reuters had earlier reported a senior German ruling coalition source as saying euro zone countries had decided in principle to help Greece.

    • Reader MK shouts out a link that Goldman Sachs helped Greece mask it’s true debt. With Euro treaties limiting deficits to 3% and debt to 60% of GDP, Greece used complex swaps with “fictional exchange rates” to get some creating financing, thus moving out some debt to 10-15 years later. The treaties don’t treat such swap liabilities (“derivatives”) as real debt, so it doesn’t get counted – but hey, it’s debt because the structure makes it repayable. The problem with derivatives is in their abuse to do regulatory arbitrage – if they now change the rules,  everyone else who’s made these kind of trades gets smashed. And heck, that’s the ONLY reason they won’t change the rules. This is just sick.
    • Roubini on Greece: Greece has 13% fiscal deficits coming up. There’s political problems in actually cutting it (Strikes, unrest and all that – that’s potential alternate venue for the Shiv Sena/MNS). Three coinciding events – ECB’s stimulus exit, Dubai’s default and Greek deficit revisions from 3.7% to 12.7% (Gee, you think that last one might be a little important?) did the damage. Roubini thinks they’ll have to cut spending, no matter what; default is not an option.
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    Jubilant Foodworks’ Listing Gains at 58%

    A stock out of nowhere propelled to new highs today (ok, technically anything is a new high for a freshly listed stock). A 58% listing gain saw Jubilant Foodworks close at 229 today: (HT: @prashantsolanki)

    image

    ET Story:

    A spectacular debut by Jubilant FoodWorks, which runs the Domino’s Pizza chain in India, on the bourses on Monday has come as a welcome break for a market spooked by a string of subdued first-day performances by companies newly listing their scrips. At the end of the day Jubilant Food-Works was valued at Rs 1,456 crore which compares favourably with the $622 million (around Rs 3,000 crore) market cap of the New York Stock Exchange-listed Dominos Pizzas Inc on Monday evening. The Rs 330-crore IPO proved to be an exception to most recent issues, as it offered hefty returns to investors on the first day of listing.

    You would think this was a little shady, because Jubilant has 286 stores in India and, er, the US company is 8,000 stores. Jubilant is only a franchisee and can’t do a thing other than what it’s got agreed with Dominos. They’ve made about 12 cr. in the first 6 months of this financial year, on a turnover of about 182 cr. – a margin of 5 to 6%. With the 6cr. shares outstanding the Earnings per Share was about Rs. 4 (annualized) and at the current price, the P/E ratio is 55.

    With 6 crore shares outstanding, and most of the IPO proceeds (nearly 80%) going to existing shareholders, the company wouldn’t have benefited much. Only 40 lakh shares would be a fresh issue (of an issue size of 2.2 cr. shares) – which at a price of Rs. 145 would have raised only 58 crores.

    It’s a low margin business; Even with the fresh cash they are unlikely to earn a lot more. As Deven Choksey says, this is a stretched valuation by most means. The stock should go down, though I don’t know when. Classic Pump-and-dump, don’t get caught.

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    Network18 lays off 350 more

    From Suchetadalal.com:

    Media and entertainment company Network18 Media and Investments Ltd, which has been pumping money into its cash-strapped, loss-making businesses to keep them alive, is finally taking a call on the situation. According to sources, the media company has laid off about 350 employees, mostly technical and production employees from its Web operations. It (the layoff) also includes some journalists, the majority of whom have now joined Zee Business.

    According to a source, who wishes to remain anonymous, the company has not offered any increment this year. Even its Web-based commodities operations employees have not received any increment since the last one-and-a-half years, the source added. Network18 has also reportedly closed its technical analysis beat from the Web operations of moneycontrol.com and wants to outsource the same to cut costs.

    In November too, Network18 laid off around 200 permanent employees as part of a restructuring exercise aimed at merging broadcast operations of its Hindi and English business news channels. According to a filing by the company to the Bombay Stock Exchange, the 'one time' restructuring cost it Rs4.50 crore on account of rationalising the workforce.

    Hat tip: Kaushik Gala.

    Web 18 Financials have been pretty bad:

    image

    Medianama has some gory internal details of the firings: Severance of two months, immediate fires, layoffs in all verticals of Web18.

    This was to be expected. The financials show continuous bleeding and while at Moneyoga I would wonder constantly how anyone could ever hope to compete in the space, when the leader was continuously making losses. The bubble in the media and internet space is still strong, so the Network18 group has been able to continously raise money to fund such losses, and still stay strong. The network 18 financials (across all sub-companies) have also been difficult:

    image

    • Although losses are still high, the revenue increase is a good sign.
    • EPS is shows very strange growth, and the income streams are very strangely intertwined. A good portion of revenue is internal – i.e. between companies it owns; for example, 10% of its last quarter revenues was inter-company revenue.
    • The holding patterns are strange – Web18 is held as majority owned by TV18 (another public co) and 13% by ibn18(yet another public company), both of which are owned partly by Network18. This is a maze of companies that can only confuse investors. I am VERY wary of companies that choose confusing investment structures.
    • The company  is very aggressive on media channels and is the giant of the financial media space. It deserves some premium for its size, the brand and the first mover advantage.
    • At Rs. 100, the market cap of Network18 is 1100 crores. That’s about 1x annual sales, and might be a good place to buy if the company does turn around. But it looks like investors might not be patient enough; the stock meanwhile hasn’t done too much in the last few months.

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    Disclosure: No positions

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